We consider the problem of manipulability of social choice rules in the impartial anonymous and neutral culture model (IANC) and provide a new theoretical study of the IANC model, which allows us to analytically derive the difference between the Nitzan-Kelly index in the Impartial Culture (IC) and IANC models. We show in which cases this difference is almost zero, and in which the Nitzan-Kelly index for IANC is the same as for IC. However, in some cases this difference is large enough to cause changes in the relative manipulability of social choice rules. We provide an example of such cases.
Introduction
Procedures aggregating individual preferences into a collective choice differ in their vulnerability to manipulation. We say that manipulation can occur if any voter can achieve a better voting result for himself by misrepresenting his preferences. Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) started detailed research into the problem of manipulability. They proved that any non-dictatorial social choice rule with at least three possible outcomes is manipulable.
Satterthwaite provided the definition of a strategy-proof procedure, explaining that it is a voting scheme in which no manipulation can occur. These studies have given rise to a number of extensions and generalizations of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
Following Gibbard and Satterthwaite, Barbera (1977) later studied the possibility of constructing a satisfactory social choice procedure, proving that a social choice rule that satisfies the unanimity condition and does not leave "too much" to chance must be either uniformly manipulable or dictatorial.
The problem of manipulability was widely investigated by J. Kelly. In Kelly (1977) it was proved that, without an assumption of single-valuedness, rules that satisfy both nondictatorship and strategy-proofness could exist. However, Duggan and Schwartz (2000) proved that, assuming three or more alternatives, non-manipulability and non-dictatorship are inconsistent with citizens' sovereignty and residual resoluteness. Citizens' sovereignty means that the social choice rule could produce any alternative as a result. Residual resoluteness assumes that a rule does not produce ties if all preferences are the same (say, x above y) or if just one voter deviates (putting y above x).
The next problem in studying manipulability was to compare social choice procedures in their vulnerability to manipulation. The first approach is measuring the probability that in a randomly chosen preference profile manipulation is possible. Since it was introduced in Nitzan (1985) and Kelly (1988) , we call this measure the Nitzan-Kelly's index. The latter also considers an approach that takes into account the number of profiles where manipulation is very unlikely to occur, although still possible. In Kelly (1993) the first method was developed and supported by computational results on the relative manipulability of social choice rules. Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999) and Aleskerov et al (2011) continued this line of research. The first paper contains the results of computational experiments that reveal the degree of manipulability of social choice rules. In addition, the authors introduced some new indexes for evaluating manipulability. In Aleskerov et al (2011) , which is fundamental to this study, manipulability is studied in two ways. It extends the number of voters in the computational experiment and uses different methods of expanding preferences.
4
All the listed articles focus on individual manipulations under impartial culture assumption. The impartial culture model was introduced in Guilbaud (1952) . This model assumes that a set of all preference profiles is used for generating voters' preferences. Another important probabilistic model is the impartial anonymous culture model (IAC), first described in Kuga and Nagatani (1974) and Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976) . The question of manipulability of social choice rules in the IAC model was thoroughly investigated by Pritchard and Wilson (2007) , Lepelley and Valognes (2002) , Favardin and Lepelley (2006) , and Slinko (2006) . These four publications are devoted to the study of coalitional manipulations.
In this paper, we consider the impartial anonymous and neutral culture model (IANC), in which both names of voters and names of alternatives do not matter. In this model, some preference profiles are regarded as equivalent in terms of permutations of individuals and alternatives. Therefore, the set of all preference profiles splits up into equivalence classes. The first investigation of this model was started in Egecioglu (2005) and extended in Egecioglu and Giritligil (2009) . They introduced a way of calculating the number of anonymous and neutral equivalence classes and an algorithm for their uniform random generation. However, this model has not been thoroughly analyzed yet. Particularly, a way of analyzing the difference of indexes in IC and IANC without conducting a computational experiment has not been investigated in the literature.
In the IC model, the Nitzan-Kelly's index is a proportion of manipulated profiles in the set of all preference profiles. In the IANC model we consider not profiles, but equivalence classes, and the Nitzan-Kelly's index in IANC is a proportion of manipulated equivalence classes. The reason why we consider such a difficult model as IANC is that every sensible social choice rule satisfies both anonymity and neutrality, it means that any two preference profiles that differ in permutation of voters and (or) names of alternatives will be both either manipulable or not with respect to those rules. We can regard an equivalence class as a type of group preference, so, considering only representatives of equivalence classes, we do not count preference profiles of the same type twice.
The difficulty is that computational experiments in the IANC model have rather high complexity, and the number of equivalence classes is still very large (see Tab. 1 below). The algorithm for generating representatives of equivalence classes was introduced in Egecioglu (2005) . However, we should know whether the results of computational experiments in IANC would differ from those in the basic IC model. Then, if this difference is not zero, could it significantly influence the relative manipulability of social choice rules?
Using combinatorial methods and elements of group theory, we derive the difference of indexes in IANC and IC models. We study properties of equivalence classes with maximal and minimal number of elements and evaluate the maximal difference of probabilistic measures for the number of voters and alternatives up to 10. 7
Tab
If for a given permutation g there exists a profile P , such that g PP  then P is called a fixed-point of g. The set of all fixed points for g is
For a given profile P a set of all permutations that do not change P is a subgroup of G and is called a stabilizer of P . This set is defined as
The number of elements in the orbit of P (or its equivalence class) can be evaluated as a ratio
multiple of the parts of  . The number of anonymous and neutral equivalence classes for n voters and m alternatives was found in Egecioglu (2005) . It is given by
For n and ! m being relatively prime the number of equivalence classes
In addition, we give some definitions on manipulability. The preference profile where all individuals express their true preferences except the i-th individual is denoted by
P is the deviation of the i-th individual from his true preferences
The social choice (or the outcome of aggregating procedure) with respect to the profile P is denoted by () CP. As in Aleskerov et al. (2010) , the case of multiple choice is considered. That means that the result of an aggregating procedure might consist of several elements. Pattanaik (1978) , are considered.
On the basis of a linear order representing voter's preferences on the set of alternatives, expanded preferences order all the subsets of A . In the Leximin method, the worst alternatives of two sets are compared, and the set where the better alternative is contained is considered as the better set. If they are the same, then the second-worst alternatives are compared and so on. In the Leximax method of expanding preferences, the best alternatives are compared, then the secondbest alternatives and so on. 
Anonymous and neutral equivalence classes
In this section, we reveal some properties of anonymous and neutral equivalence classes in order to evaluate the maximal difference of indexes in the IC and IANC models. We discuss the problem of difference in terms of manipulability, but all these results are applicable to the study of any other probability in the IC and IANC models. First, we consider what properties 9 cause this difference. Let us consider a hypothetical example of a set  consisting of ten preference profiles. Assume that there are four ANECs: two classes of cardinality 2, one class of cardinality 5, and the last one has only one preference profile. Fig. 1 . A hypothetical example of four equivalence classes.
We can assume that only profiles from the biggest equivalence class are manipulable.
Consequently, the manipulability index in the IC model is 0.5, while in the IANC model this index is equal to 0.25 because only 1 of 4 equivalence classes is manipulable. So, we can see that this difference results from an inequality of equivalence classes. In the IANC model all equivalence classes are equally likely.
Therefore, the manipulability index in IC exceeds the index in IANC if the average cardinality of equivalence classes that are manipulable exceeds the average cardinality of all equivalence classes. On the contrary, the manipulability index is less in IC than in IANC, if the average cardinality of equivalence classes that are manipulable is less than the average cardinality of all equivalence classes.
To start with, we consider equivalence classes that have the least and the greatest cardinality.
Theorem 1 (Anonymous and neutral equivalence class with the minimal number of elements)
The minimal number of elements in an anonymous and neutral equivalence class is ! m . This class is unique for the case of 3 n  .
Next, we determine the cardinality of maximal equivalence class. In contrast to minimal equivalence classes, there could be more than one maximal equivalence class. Evaluating the exact number of such classes is a rather difficult computational and combinatorial problem and requires some specific calculations in most cases. However, we can estimate this number by an interval, which is, surprisingly, not only rather small, but also tends to zero as m and n grow.
First, let us denote the set of preference profiles consisting of different columns by  .
The number of equivalence classes on this set is denoted by ( , ) R m n . Finally, g F is a set of fixed
Lemma 3
The number of fixed-points from  for some permutation
Since the preference profiles in a maximal equivalence class in the case ! mn  always consist of different columns, our next step is to evaluate the number of ANECs on  .
Theorem 4
For any m and n such that ! mn  , the number of equivalence classes on  is equal to
Theorem 4 allows us to make an important corollary concerning maximal equivalence classes.
Corollary 5
For any m and n such that ! mn  a), the number of maximal ANEC satisfies the following inequality 
Evaluating the difference of the Nitzan-Kelly's index
In this section we apply theoretical results to the problem of evaluating the maximal difference of manipulability indexes. As mentioned earlier, the inequality of ANECs' cardinality causes this difference. We illustrate this in the following diagram. On the x-axis are 24 ANECs 
However, for a certain value of n the second maximal cardinality of ANECs also begins to exceed the average. To evaluate this value, we can use the following approximation. For simplicity, the number of equivalence classes is calculated as in the case of n and ! m being relatively prime
Then the average number of elements in ANEC is Using Corollary 5, we get the difference in the case of ! mn  estimated by the interval
And an exact value of the maximal difference for m and n such that nm  and n is a prime number
The following figures illustrate the behavior of the difference for the number of alternatives from 3 to 10 and the same number of voters. For the case of three and four alternatives, this difference is large enough to cause changes in the relative manipulability of social choice rules. At the same time, for the case of six or more alternatives, it becomes so small and insignificant that we can take indexes in the IC model equal to those in the IANC model.
However, we should also take into account that this difference increases up to a certain value, which is to be calculated in future research. 
Manipulability of social choice rules in IC and IANC models
Using the results of the theoretical study from the previous section, we calculate the maximal difference of the Nitzan-Kelly's indexes in the IC and IANC models and compare it with the actual difference of this index for four social choice rules. First, we give a formal definition of these rules.
1. Plurality Rule. This rule chooses the best alternative for the maximal number of voters.
2. Approval Voting. Social choice is an alternative at the place of q or higher in the preferences of the maximal number of voters. The plurality rule has the highest level of difference for 3 10 n  . These two facts cause the changes in the relative manipulability of social choice rules. Figures 6 and 7 However, Black's procedure is the least manipulable in both cultures. In the IC model, the Nitzan-Kelly's index is the probability that any preference profile independently drawn from the set of all preference profiles will be manipulable. In the IANC model, it is the same probability on the set of anonymous and neutral equivalence classes. How do these probabilities differ from each other? Using methods of combinatorics and group theory, we evaluate the number and cardinality of anonymous and neutral equivalence classes with a maximal and minimal number of elements. We evaluate maximal difference of any probability Since all profiles consisting of similar preferences belong to the same equivalence class, we can conclude that it is unique. An equivalence class with a minimal number of elements is denoted by min  .
The cardinality of such a class is We can always build a profile consisting of different columns that does not satisfy this property the following way. Take any profile consisting of different columns that has at least two stabilizing permutations. Then reverse the order of any two alternatives such that columns are still not repeated and the mentioned property is not satisfied. Thus, the only stabilizing permutation for a described profile Inside any cycle there cannot appear any column that is already used, because a permutation  splits up the set of all different columns into non-intersecting orbits of columns that can be produced one from another by this permutation. Columns in every cycle form one of such orbits.
Finally, we get an exact formula for the number of fixed-points from  for some permutation 
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Proof. Let R be the number of ANECs on  , and 12 , ,..., R P P P be the representatives of these classes. 
